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ABSTRACT 
 
A collaboration is a collection of services that work 
together to achieve a common goal. Although collab-
orations help when tackling difficult problems, they lead 
to security issues. First, a collaboration is often per-
formed by services that are drawn from different security 
domains. Second, a service interacts with multiple peer 
services during the collaboration. These interactions are 
not isolated from one another -- e.g., data may flow 
through a sequence of different services. As a result, a 
service is exposed to multiple peer services in varying 
degrees, leading to different security threats. We identify 
the types of interactions that can be present in 
collaborations, and discuss the security threats due to 
each type. We propose a model for representing the 
collaboration context so that a service can be made 
aware of the existing interactions.  We provide an access 
control model for a service participating in a collab-
oration. We couple our access control model with a 
policy model, so that the access requirements from 
collaborations can be expressed and evaluated.  
 
 
KEYWORDS:  access control, collaboration context, 
web services, workflow planning 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In service-oriented architectures (SOA), a collaboration 
involves multiple services 
working together to achieve 
a common goal. Services are 
expected to cooperate and 
interact with each other. 
Through these interactions, 
each service exchanges 
information and accomplish-
es its own part in the 
collaboration. Our work 
focuses on collaborations 
that include services drawn 
from different security do-mains that may or may not trust 
one another.  
 
A collaboration can be realized via many technologies, 
from mash-ups [10] to scientific workflows [5][6]. All of 
these technologies use the same SOA principle: defining 
web services as autonomous end points that partake in a 
complex application. 
 
Although collaborations are beneficial for tackling 
difficult problems, they lead to important security issues. 
One of them is managing access to a participant service. 
By joining a collaboration, a service agrees to interact 
with several peer services. Due to these interactions, the 
service would become subject to varying security threats 
(described below and in Section 3.1). 
 
The fundamental component of collaboration is an 
interaction: a data transfer between two services, a sender 
and a recipient, that is triggered by an action taken by the 
sender service and is ended by an action taken by the 
recipient service (Figure 1). The action refers to execution 
of a specific operation of the service (as defined by Web 
Services Description Languages (WSDL) [18]). 
 
A collaboration includes several interactions among 
multiple services. These interactions are not isolated from 
one another; instead, they follow one another to 
disseminate data and ultimately achieve the 
collaboration’s goal. A specific interaction is affected by 
other interactions. For example, in Figure 1, the order 
information sent by the buyer service in Interaction 1 
Figure 1. Web Service Collaboration. 
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Figure 2. IBAC Framework. 
affects the outcome of the 
seller service, which later 
uses this information to 
invoke the shipper service 
(Interaction 3). As a result, 
the execution of the 
initShipment operation is 
also affected by the buyer 
service.  
 
An interaction introduces 
security threats to both 
sender and recipient 
services. From the recip-
ient’s view, the sent data 
may include viruses or 
Trojan horses, or performing the requested action can 
expose the recipient’s domain to the sender. From the 
sender’s view, the transferred data may be confidential, or 
the sender’s operation may expose the sender’s business 
logic to the recipient. Moreover, a recipient may refuse to 
interact with a sender which had previously interacted 
with an un-trusted service. Likewise, a sender may refuse 
to interact with a recipient that will later interact with an 
un-trusted service. (In Section 3.2, we will explain how a 
sender can learn about future interactions of its recipient.)  
 
Consider the seller service in Figure 1, and Interactions 1 
and 3, where the seller service acts first as a recipient and 
then as a sender. For its security, the seller service must 
evaluate both interactions. The evaluation of each 
interaction must consider the differences in the roles 
played by the seller service, the data transferred, and the 
interacting peer services. The seller service may have 
different security requirements for allowing invocation of 
the processOrder operation than for sending some of its 
output to shipping service.  
 
Our work aims to protect a service in collaboration by 
managing access control decisions for the service. To 
achieve this, we propose an interaction-based access 
control model (IBAC). We model a collaboration in terms 
of interactions, and define a collaboration context. By 
evaluating the collaboration context, the IBAC model can 
determine the access decisions for a service. Our work 
enables a service to evaluate a proposed collaboration 
context before deciding to join the collaboration. If the 
access decision returned by the IBAC engine is deny, the 
service refuses the collaboration, because the collab-
oration contains insecure interactions.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates an overview of our work from the 
Seller Service’s perspective. The collaboration engine 
(responsible for planning the collaboration) sends 
invitations (the proposed collaboration context) to three 
services. Each service has an IBAC engine (PEP+PDP) 
and a collaboration policy to evaluate a proposed 
collaboration in terms of security. During the evaluation, 
each service requests and receives credentials of its peer 
services and determines its policy decision. Our main 
contributions are the IBAC model (implemented in the 
IBAC engine) and the collaboration policy model. 
 
Prior work [2] has introduced context-awareness into the 
access control models. The context was defined as any 
information characterizing an object and surrounding 
environment, such as the time, location or the load over 
the object. We define a collaboration context as an 
ordered collection of interactions. We first study the 
interaction types that can occur in collaborations and 
discuss the security threats due to each type (Section 3.1). 
Then, we use the interaction types in order to develop a 
model for the collaboration context (Section 3.2).  
 
IBAC model (Section 3.3) is designed to evaluate a 
collaboration context against the access requirements. It 
has a comprehensive approach: it evaluates the entire 
context to reach an access decision, instead of evaluating 
each interaction individually. This is to understand the 
security consequences of combined interactions. There-
fore, a deny decision from IBAC engine means denial of 
the entire proposed collaboration.  
 
Based on our access control model, we develop a new 
policy model (Section 4), that is designed to express 
access requirements for joining collaborations. A 
collaboration policy is prepared even before a service is 
advertised for collaborations. Therefore, the access 
requirements are expressed in a generic fashion, such that 
arbitrary collaboration proposals can be evaluated against 
a policy. To achieve this, we express the access 
requirements based on interaction types. At evaluation 
time, the policy evaluation engine dynamically selects the 
access requirements that match the proposed collaboration 
context and only evaluates those requirements to reach a 
policy decision. In addition, the selected access 
requirements are not uniformly applied to all of the peer 
services; different subjects (i.e. peer services) can be 
applied to different access requirements based on their 
interaction types. In order to ease the adoption of our 
policy model, we implemented it as an enhancement of a 
widely-adopted access control language, XACML [11]. 
We implemented components to evaluate and enforce our 
access control and policy models (Section 5).  
 
2. BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK 
 
2.1. Background and Assumptions 
 
We define a collaboration as a directed acyclic graph, a 
collaboration graph.1  Each node of the graph indicates a 
service with one or more operations. An edge indicates the 
data transferred between two operations. The direction of 
the edge is same as the direction of the dataflow. When 
we refer to an interaction, we mean a specific data transfer 
(i.e. an edge) between two service operations.  
 
A service is the provision of any kind of facility to the 
public, such as computing power, storage, or remote code 
invocation. A service is not limited to its domain 
boundaries; it is exposed over a network, and utilizes 
Web-Service standards such as WSDL [18] and SOAP 
[15]. Each service’s security policy is private, and is not 
divulged to other services, or to the collaboration. Each 
service has credentials (such as X.509 service certificates) 
that can be evaluated by its peers for authorization and 
authentication purposes.  
 
We do not limit ourselves to any specific collaboration 
technology; the collaboration can be executed in any 
manner. We assume that there is a collaboration engine 
that is responsible for managing the collaboration, such as 
defining the choreography (i.e. order of interactions) and 
selecting suitable services for the interactions. Selected 
services are bound in the resulting choreography 
document (e.g., a WS-CDL [19] document -- see Section 
5.1.1). We do not assume that the selection process has 
taken any security aspects into consideration. Thus, 
services may be drawn from different security domains, 
and they may or may not trust one another. 
 
The collaboration engine invites selected services to join 
the collaboration. The proposal message includes a 
collaboration context, based on which services make their 
decisions to join the collaboration. We assume that the 
                                                 
1 The model is not limited to acyclic graphs, but our current 
implementation does not support cycles. 
services trust the collaboration engine in creating accurate 
collaboration contexts. (An untrusting service can decline 
the invitation.) For added security, the collaboration 
engine should sign its messages. It is also expected that 
services will check the collaboration context against the 
run time accesses made by their peers, but such checking 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2.2. Related Work 
 
Kang’s work [7] and the WAS framework [8] both assume 
a multi-domain security model. A central engine acts as a 
trusted third party, consults with the services’ domains 
and determines which services can interact with one 
another. The main drawback of these frameworks is that 
the central engine requires prior knowledge about the 
security policies of services. Our work assumes that each 
service’s policy is private and is not divulged to the 
collaboration enginer, nor to the peer services. 
 
In Koshutanski’s work [9], only the service that initiates a 
collaboration is evaluated by its peer services: the first 
service is authorized by the second one, and when the 
second service interacts with a third service, the second 
one is evaluated by the third service, and so on. 
Koshutanski assumes that since the first service caused all 
of the interactions, it is sufficient to evaluate the first 
service by all other services. Unlike our approach, he 
omits the interactions among other services.  
 
Shehab [14] introduces the secure access path, which 
represents the access history of a user. He assumes 
multiple security domains and cross-domain role-
mappings between the domains: a role in one domain can 
have the privileges of another role in the mapped domain. 
However, he does not discuss the generation of role- 
mappings, which requires pre-established trust relation-
ships among the domains and a central agreement over the 
role-mappings. Each domain is assumed to be aware of 
which mappings are forbidden or authorized. An access 
decision involves checking the access path of an access 
request to see if there are any unauthorized mappings (i.e. 
interactions).  
 
This work is similar to ours, in that an access path can 
represent an interaction between two domains. Shehab’s 
work assumes each domain knows which role mappings 
are allowed. In our model, each service has a separate 
private policy and autonomously evaluates the 
collaboration context from its own view  it is not 
dependent on any centrally agreed mappings. An 
interaction deemed secure by one service may be deemed 
insecure by its interacting peer.  
 
Toninelli [17] and Shafiq [13] propose a model for 
collaborative environments; however, a dynamic 
collaboration consists of a requestor and an object that do 
not know each other. Toninelli’s access control model 
dynamically changes the access requirements based on the 
collaboration context. She achieves this by reasoning over 
the context and policies. Shafiq uses trust negotiation and 
trust management to map unknown users into the 
GTRBAC model.   
 
3. AN INTERACTION-BASED ACCESS 
CONTROL MODEL (IBAC) 
 
A subject, or a requestor, is an entity that requests access. 
An object is a resource that is being requested. An action 
is an activity that is to be performed on the object. A 
collaborative peer is a service. In a collaboration, a 
service can act both as a subject and as an object. 
  
3.1. Interaction Types 
 
The IBAC model manages access to a service based on 
the types of interactions that are present in a proposed 
collaboration.  An interaction between two services is 
classified along two dimensions: the proximity of the 
services (direct vs. indirect) and the direction of dataflow 
between them (upstream vs. downstream).    
 
A direct interaction occurs when the first service transfers 
data to the second, without relaying it through other 
services. For example, seller and shipper in Figure 1 have 
a direct interaction. Any direct interaction between 
services is a bilateral relationship, even when the 
dataflow seems to be one-sided. To illustrate this,  the 
seller service presents a shipping request to the shipper 
service and the shipper determines if it trusts the buyer for 
invoking initShipment operation. However, there are 
actually two relationships: (1) the seller determines that it 
trusts the shipper to send its request, and (2) the shipper 
determines that it trusts the buyer to process the request. 
 
Both seller and shipper access requests involve risk. From 
the seller’s perspective, the shipper could be a rival 
company with whom the seller is not willing to do 
business; from the shipper’s perspective, the seller could 
be a malicious user who sends a Trojan horse. Existing 
access control models such as TrustMaker [3], RBAC 
[12] or ACL-based schemes, are geared towards assessing 
the trustworthiness of the requestor. The reverse trust 
evaluation – i.e., the trustworthiness of the requested 
object from the subject’s viewpoint – is not explicitly 
modeled. Instead, it is assumed that the subject implicitly 
makes a trust evaluation before launching its request. This 
implicit modeling does not work in a multi-party 
collaboration, where services do not have a say in the 
selection of other services, nor may not have established 
trust among each other. The collaboration engine selects 
services to interact with each other; this does not 
guarantee that services do not possess any security threats 
to one another. IBAC model, on the other hand, allows the 
reverse trust evaluation: the seller can evaluate the 
shipper’s trustworthiness by evaluating its downstream 
interaction, whereas, the shipper can evaluate the seller’s 
trustworthiness by evaluating its upstream interaction.  
 
An indirect interaction occurs when data is relayed 
through one or more intermediate services. The buyer and 
the shipper services in Figure 1 have an indirect 
interaction. There are several reasons why indirect 
interactions must be carefully evaluated. Confidential 
documents or the results of a sensitive service are 
typically passed among several peers throughout the 
collaboration; thus even an indirect neighbor might have 
access to confidential data, or a modified version or a 
portion of the confidential data. The original owner and 
the final recipient of the data are subject to security threats 
introduced by the intermediate parties that handled and 
processed the data. An intermediate domain with security 
breaches may unknowingly expose other domains to these 
threats. Furthermore, partnership agreements and 
competition among businesses may prevent them from 
doing business with certain organizations. Even when 
such interactions are safe from a security standpoint, the 
higher-level business logic may forbid them.  
 
We refine direct and indirect interactions with respect to 
the direction of the dataflow: upstream and downstream 
interactions. A service has an upstream interaction with 
another service when it is the recipient of the data. When a 
service is the sender of the data, it has a downstream 
interaction. For example, the seller has a direct-upstream 
interaction with the buyer in Figure 1, and the buyer has a 
direct-downstream interaction with the seller.  
 
Refining an interaction with respect to its dataflow is 
important. Although two services participate in the same 
interaction, their roles, i.e. sender and recipient, and their 
actions are different. Thus, the security threats introduced 
to the services are different. The sender, for example, is 
concerned about revealing its data to the recipient. The 
recipient is concerned about allowing the data flow into its 
domain. Informing a service only about the interaction 
type such as direct or indirect is not sufficient. The service 
must also be informed about its role in the interaction 
because, based on its role, a service’s access requirements 
from an interaction may change.  
 
3.2. The Motivation for IBAC Model  
 
At the heart of our work is IBAC’s ability to express 
access requirements based on interaction types.  A service 
owner defines the security requirements for her service 
even before advertising the service for collaborations. 
Therefore, the requirements are not specific to a given 
collaboration. The service owner considers the 
functionalities that her service offers and the collaboration 
scenarios that her service would likely to participate.  
 
For example, if a service provides loan approval for 
purchases, it is likely that it will be used in scenarios 
where it interacts with banks, car dealers, lenders and 
buyers services. Obviously, the service owner cannot 
predict each and every collaboration scenario, nor should 
she have to. Instead, she defines security requirements for 
possible interactions that may involve her service.  
 
To achieve this, she does a risk vs. threat analysis by 
answering several questions. For example, is the service 
sensitive enough to be protected against indirect peers? If 
so, what security requirements must be requested from 
such peers? Is the direction of indirect peers affects the 
requirements – downstream or upstream peers should be 
subjected to same requirements?  Does the exact distance 
between two peers affect the security requirements – 
should the policy set different requirements for varying 
distance, instead of subjecting all indirect peers to the 
same rules? Should direct peers be subjected to access 
requirements that are designed for traditional one-to-one 
interactions or new requirements must be written? If so, 
what should be the requirements with respect to the 
direction?  
 
For each interaction type, the owner analyzes the risk vs. 
threat factors and the resulting requirements constitute the 
service’s collaboration policy. Our work does not include 
how risk vs. threat analysis must be done for a service. 
Our work aims to enable a service owner to express its 
requirements in a policy model and evaluate them. In the 
next section, we explain how our policy model expresses 
such requirements.  
 
3.3. Collaboration Context 
 
The collaboration context of a service is the collection of 
interactions that affects the security of the service. A 
collaboration context is specific for each service, even in 
the same collaboration. The context indicates the dataflow 
from and into the service throughout the collaboration. 
Formally, the collaboration context of service V is a 
collection of directed walks Wm such that Wm begins or 
ends with V. The directed walk Wm can have an upstream 
or downstream direction.  
 
 A collaboration engine generates a context for each 
service of the collaboration. Since the collaboration 
engine has a global view of the graph, a context includes 
both preceding and succeeding interactions affecting a 
service. This allows the service to make access decisions 
based not only on the past access history (as in Chinese 
Wall [4] and Shehab’s work [14]), but also on future 
accesses -- i.e., interactions with downstream services. 
 
3.4. Access Control Model 
 
IBAC model has four entities defined: interaction, subject, 
object and action. The object represents the service that is 
protected by the model.  
 
Our access control model has an interaction-based view; 
each access requirement is stated for an interaction type. 
Each subject (peer service) is distinguished by its 
interaction type and evaluated against the access 
requirements specified for that interaction type. For 
example, in Figure 3, both Service 1 and 2 request 
invocation of Service 3; Service 2 has an upstream-direct 
interaction, whereas Service 1 has an upstream-indirect 
interaction. As a result, 3 can apply different access 
requirements to 2 and 1.   
  
Since existing access control models aim to evaluate a 
single interaction between a subject and an object, a single 
access request represents a single interaction. This is 
insufficient for IBAC model; therefore, we define a 
collaboration request in lieu of an access request. A 
collabora-tion request is generated from the collaboration 
context and represents mul-tiple interactions. It conveys 
information about all of the accesses (direct/in-direct, 
upstream/down-stream) that will be performed by the peer 
services once the collaboration is executed.  
 
The collaboration re-quest, generated by the IBAC PEP,  
Figure 3. Sample Collaboration and Collaboration Request. 
includes four pieces of information: the interaction types, 
subjects, the actions, and the object (see Figure 3). The 
collaboration request maintains the association among a 
subject, its interaction type with the object, and the 
requested action. The interaction type can either include 
direct/indirect keywords, or it can specify the exact 
number of edges between two services. There are multiple 
subjects, actions, interaction types; however, there is only 
a single object: the requested service and its operations.    
 
There are two actions defined in our model: invoke and 
consume. The invoke action is requested by an upstream 
service (subject) in order to invoke an operation over the 
requested service, while the consume action is requested 
by a downstream service (subject) that will access the data 
out of the protected service.   
 
4. COLLABORATION POLICY MODEL 
 
4.1. Policy Requirements 
 
First, a policy must be able to express access requirements 
that are designed for specific interaction types. These 
requirements must be expressed in a generic way to 
evaluate arbitrary collaborations. Second, a collaboration 
policy must be easily integrated into an existing access 
control system. It must coexist with policies that are 
traditionally used to evaluate one-to-one access requests. 
A collaboration policy (1) must not disrupt any existing 
access control system, (2) must be easily augmented to the 
existing system, and (3) may make use of existing policies 
whenever desirable. The third requirement promotes 
policy reuse among the collaboration policies and 
underlying policies.  
 
A collaboration policy is the smallest unit that manages 
access decisions for a service. For each service that 
participates in 
collaborations, there 
must be a separate 
collaboration policy. 
Within a 
collaboration policy, 
an access rule is the 
smallest building 
block that states the 
access requirements 
sought from a subject 
that exhibits a spe-
cific interaction type.  
 
4.2. Access Rules 
 
An access rule has three elements: Tar-get, Type and Con-
ditions. The Target element consists of the designated 
inter-action type, subject, object and action entities. In 
addition to using direct/indirect keywords, the interaction 
type can indicate the number of edges between a subject 
and an object. In a rule that specifies an upstream 
interaction, the action must be set to invoke. In a rule that 
targets downstream interactions, the action is set to 
consume. The object is the service being protected by the 
policy. Since a service can have multiple operations, 
different rules of the service’s policy can be stated for 
different operations. Then, the rule target includes the 
service operation in addition to the service name. (See 
Figure 4.)  
 
The Type of a rule indicates whether it is evaluated by the 
local collaboration policy, or an existing underlying policy 
(external to the collaboration policy.)  This allows for rule 
reuse. (Both types of rule are shown in the policy for 
Figure 4.) 
 
The Conditions element contains the access requirements 
of a rule. An access requirement is represented as a 
predicate, whose evaluated result will be either true or 
false. A true evaluation is associated with “permit”, and 
false evaluation is associated with “deny”.  
 
The result of each rule is combined with respect to a 
combination algorithm. The result of the combination 
algorithm constitutes the policy decision. A policy writer 
can specify a custom-made combination algorithm; using 
Boolean operators AND and OR.  
 
4.3. Policy Evaluation 
 
After the IBAC PEP generates the collaboration request, 
the request is matched against all of the collaboration 
policies stored at the IBAC PDP. The matched policy 
Figure 4. Policy Evaluation. 
 
starts evaluating its rules against the collaboration request. 
Each rule is matched against a subject, the subject’s 
interaction type with the object, and the requested action. 
If there is no match, the rule result is “inapplicable”. If the 
rule target matches, the rule evaluates the subject.  
 
In Figure 5, we show a proposed collaboration and 
Service 3’s collaboration policy. The LocalRule1 is 
specified for the Op31 and targets any peers with an direct 
interaction type: Service 4 and Service 6 both match and 
they are separately evaluated against this rule. In order for 
a rule to return permit decision, all matching subjects must 
satisfy the rule; thus, both 4 and 5 must meet this rule’s 
requirements. Each rule’s result is combined with respect 
to the policy combining algorithm, which determines the 
policy decision. A policy decision can either be permit or 
deny.  
 
5. IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Due to the difficulties involved with developing a new 
policy language, we enhanced a widely-adop-ted 
language, XACML [11].  Sun Microsystems’ 
implementation of the XACML framework [16] is used as 
the foundation for our prototype.   
 
We also implemented the collaboration engine and the 
IBAC engine that has a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) 
and a Policy Decision Point (PDP).  A detailed discussion 
of the implementation can be found elsewhere [1]; here 
we briefly discuss the collaboration engine, and changes 
to the XACML language and evaluation framework. 
 
5.1. Collaboration Engine. We implemented the 
collaboration engine as a standalone web service. The 
prototype collaboration engine only manages the access 
control issues within the collaboration; it does not handle 
service selection and discovery, execution, fault recovery, 
etc. We anticipate that our code would be incorporated 
into a fully-fledged collaboration engine that handles the 
missing aspects.  
 
The collaboration engine has a repository of 
collaborations, described in WS-CDL (Web Services 
Choreography Description Language) [19]. We chose 
WS-CDL because (1) it is an XML-based language, (2) it 
describes the collaboration as a collection of interactions 
among multiple parties, and (3) it maintains a global view 
of the collaboration. A WS-CDL document includes the 
service bindings, where each binding points to the WSDL 
of a selected service.   
When a service is selected for a collaboration and notified 
by the collaboration engine, the service’s PEP informs the 
engine about the interaction types required by its 
collaboration policy. Note that the PEP does not divulge 
its collaboration policy entirely, only the interaction types 
required.  The collaboration engine creates the 
collaboration context, identifies and informs the peer 
services that have interactions with the evaluating service.. 
Each peer’s PEP sends its credential to the authorizing 
service’s PEP.  If a peer does not have the requested 
credential type, the collaboration is denied. The 
evaluating service’s PEP collects the peers’ credentials 
with the collaboration context, and creates the 
collaboration request.  
 
The collaboration engine repeats the above steps for each 
service proposed for the collaboration and allows each to 
evaluate its peers.  The results of these evaluations are 
collected to determine whether the collaboration is 
allowed. 
 
5.2. XACML Enhancements. Since a collaboration 
request represents multiple interactions, we implemented 
it as a collection of XACML requests, each containing an 
interaction, a subject, an action and a resource (i.e. an 
object). Each XACML request represents a single 
interaction from the collaboration context.  
 
We also modified the XACML policy-matching logic. 
Since a collaboration request has multiple XACML 
requests embedded inside, we ensured that a selected 
collaboration policy simultaneously matches all of the 
embedded XACML requests. Otherwise, the collaboration 
request could be evaluated against a policy that is not 
designed for all of the interaction types within the 
collaboration request. Each rule checks for each XACML 
request whether it matches the rule and, if so, it evaluates 
the XACML request. Moreover, we modified the native 
XACML policy-matching and rule-matching algorithms to 
consider interaction entity.  
 
XACML rules do not have any types; we enhanced this by 
introducing two rule types.  For Local rule type, we did 
not make any modifications.  For Underlying rule type, we 
modified the XACML rule evaluation logic by inserting a 
software hook.  When the hook is executed, it converts the 
portion of the collaboration request that is being evaluated 
back into a plain-XACML request format, and sends this 
to the underlying enforcement agent. (The hook can create 
requests based on the policy language of the underlying 
system; current implementation assumes it is native 
XACML.) The policy decision returned from the 
underlying system is treated as the result of the 
Underlying type rule.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Managing access to a service in collaborative   
environments is more challenging than in traditional one-
to-one settings. The number of peers and the multiplicity 
of the interactions between the peers complicate the 
access management.  
 
In this paper, we studied the consequences of peer-to-peer 
interactions over the access management of a service. We 
modeled an interaction as dual access request between two 
peers. This allowed each peer to evaluate the security 
risks from their own perspective. Moreover, we found that 
due to the continuous flow of interactions, peers interact 
with one another directly or indirectly. This made us 
realize that accesses among the peers occur at different 
levels. Different interaction types leads to different 
accesses between the peers. Nevertheless, each interaction 
type, hence each access, introduces its unique security 
threats.  
 
This situation motivated us to design an interaction-based 
access control model that considers the interaction types 
as an integral element of its decision logic. Different 
interaction types, hence different accesses, may be applied 
to different access requirements. In addition, we found 
that an interaction originally deemed secure may become 
a security threat when combined with another interaction. 
Therefore, we developed a model for representing the 
collaboration context and designed our access control 
model to evaluate this context comprehensively. Overall, 
our work aims to increase services’ willingness to 
collaborate by enabling them to address the security issues 
in a policy-driven and collaboration-agnostic manner. 
 
References 
 
[1] Altunay, M., COLLABORATION POLICIES: ACCESS 
CONTROL IN SOA-BASED DYNAMIC COLLABORA-
TIONS, PhD Thesis, North Carolina State University, 2007. 
 
[2] Ardagna, C.A., M. Cremonini, E. Damiani, S. De Capitani di 
Vimercati, and P. Samarati, “Supporting Location-based 
Conditions in Access Control Policies,” ACM Symposium on 
Information, Computer and Communications Security 
(ASIACCS '06), 2006. 
 
[3] Blaze, M., J. Feigenbaum, J. Ionaddis, and A.D. Keromytis, 
“The Role of Trust Management in Distributed Systems 
Security,” In SECURE INTERNET PROGRAMMING: THE 
SECURITY ISSUES FOR MOBILE AND DISTRIBUTED 
OBJECTS, Springer-Verlag, 1999, pp. 185-210. 
 
[4] Brewer, D.F.C., and M.J. Nash,  “The Chinese Wall Security 
Policy,” IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, 1989. 
 
[5] Deelman, E., G. Singh, M.-H. Su, J. Blythe, Y. Gil, C. 
Kesselman, G. Mehta, K. Vahi, G.B. Berriman, J. Good, A. 
Laity, J.C. Jacob, D.S. Katz, “Pegasus: a Framework for 
Mapping Complex Scientific Workflows onto Distributed 
Systems,” Scientific Programming Journal, 13(3), 2005, pp. 
219-237. 
[6] Hull, D., K. Wolstencroft, R. Stevens, C. Goble, M.R. 
Pocock, P.Li, and T. Oinn, “Taverna: a Tool for Building and 
Running Workflows of Services,” Nucleic Acids Research, Vol. 
34, 2006. 
 
[7] Kang, M.H., J.S. Park, and Y. Peng, “Access-Control 
Mechanisms for Inter-Organizational Workflow,” ACM Symp. 
on Access Control Models and Technologies, 2001, pp. 66-74. 
 
[8] Kim, S.-H., J. Kim, S.-J. Hong, and S. Kim, “Workflow-
based Authorization Service in Grid” Intl. Workshop on Grid 
Computing (GRID’03), 2003, pp. 94-100. 
 
[9] Koshutanski, H. and F. Massacci, “An Access Control 
Framework for Business Processes for Web Services,” ACM 
Workshop on XML Security, 2003, pp. 15-24. 
 
[10] Murray, G., “Asynchronous JavaScript Technology and 
XML (AJAX) with the Java Platform,” http://java.sun.com/-
developer/-technicalArticles/J2EE/AJAX/, Oct. 2006. 
 
[11] Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS), “Extensible Access Control 
Markup Language (XACML),”  http://docs.oasis-open.org/-
xacml/2.0/-access_control-xacml-2.0-core-spec-os.pdf, Feb. 
2005. 
 
[12] Sandhu, R., “Role-Based Access Control Models,” IEEE 
Computer , 29(2), 1996, pp. 34-47. 
 
[13] Shafiq, B., E. Bertino, and A. Ghafoor, “Access Control 
Management in a Distributed Environment Supporting Dynamic 
Collaboration,” Workshop on Digital Identity Management, 
Nov. 2005. 
 
[14] Shehab, M., E. Bertino, and A. Ghafoor, “Secure 
Collaboration in Mediator-Free Environments,” ACM Conf. on 
Computer and Communication Security (CCS), Nov. 2005. 
 
[15] “Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 1.2,”  
http://www.w3.org/TR/soap12, April 2007. 
 
[16] Sun Microsystems, http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net 
 
[17] Toninelli, A., R. Montanari, L. Kagal, and O. Lassila, “A 
Semantic Context-Aware Access Control Framework for Secure 
Collaborations in Pervasive Computing Environments,” Intl. 
Semantic Web Conference, 2006. 
 
[18] W3C, “Web Services Description Language (WSDL) 1.1”, 
http://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl, March 2001. 
 
[19] W3C, “Web Services Choreography Description Language 
(WS-CDL) Version 1.0,” http://www.w3.org/TR/2005/CR-ws-
cdl-10-20051109/, Nov. 2005. 
